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Abstract
This paper argues for the UK to revisit the legal capital (maintenance of capital) doc-
trine. Leaving the EU could present an opportunity but to reform legal capital just 
because Brexit may make it possible to do so would have little merit. Three more 
substantial reasons for revisiting legal capital are developed: the evidence against 
legal capital being an effective bulwark against short termist corporate behaviour 
has continued to stack up; difficulties associated with applying legal rules on dis-
tributions in the context of modern financial reporting requirements have persisted; 
and we have a clearer sense of how creditors’ interests are affected by moving away 
from legal capital to solvency standards. The paper locates the need to revisit legal 
capital within the broader agenda for a system of effective corporate governance and 
regulation that supports economically worthwhile and sustainable business activity.
Keywords Legal capital · Solvency standards · Short termism · Distributions · 
Financial reporting · Corporate governance
1 Introduction
The modernisation of company law in the UK at the start of the twenty-first century 
settled on an ‘enlightened’ version of shareholder value as the legal basis for com-
panies to be led in ways that would be both profitable for shareholders and good for 
society. But years of financial crisis, austerity, rising inequality and environmental 
degradation have undermined ‘win–win’, ‘doing well by doing good’ assumptions 
and turned the tide in favour of more radical prescriptions for the reconceptualisa-
tion of the corporation. Whilst this movement has not yet resulted in extensive legal 
reform, the unstable and unpredictable state of British politics makes it plausible to 
envisage that bold new ideas could gain traction.
This paper actually focuses on an old idea—reform of the legal capital (main-
tenance of capital) doctrine—but the topic has more political salience than might 
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initially be associated with such a technically complex field. There are legal capi-
tal issues at the intersection of some of the main current controversies in company 
law and corporate governance—the respective roles of management and investors 
in delivering sustainable, long-term business success for the benefit of society as 
a whole, the quality of the accounting and audit services provided to the corpo-
rate sector, and the robustness of oversight and enforcement mechanisms for both 
directors’ duties and the provision of accounting and audit services. Legal capital 
is also an apt topic for a volume to mark the 20th anniversary of the Centros deci-
sion, which was a powerful catalyst for the dynamic dismantling of minimum capital 
requirements in national company laws.
Brexit makes it timely to revisit the legal capital debate. The UK’s influence on 
EU company law as an EU Member State was recently examined in a thoughtful 
article by Martin Gelter and Alexandra Reif.1 For Gelter and Reif, the way in which 
the UK was most able to use its membership position was by acting as a ‘brake’ on 
the first wave of EU harmonisation relating to core company law areas such as board 
structure and legal capital. Although the development of EU takeover, account-
ing and corporate governance geared to the needs of the capital markets during the 
1990s and 2000s was broadly consistent with British preferences, the authors sug-
gest that this was less to do with active pressure from the UK within EU legislative 
processes than with its high reputation as a model jurisdiction for the design of cor-
porate governance and capital markets regulation. In this sense, the UK’s member-
ship of the EU could be described as irrelevant for harmonisation in areas relating to 
capital markets because the real driver was market forces.
So far as Brexit is concerned, this chapter turns the inquiry in the opposite direc-
tion: the EU’s influence on UK company law where EU membership acted as a 
brake on the design of substantive domestic laws. This question has not yet received 
close attention. To be clear, some scholars have begun to explore possible effects 
of Brexit on the future trajectory of company law in the UK but this inquiry has 
focused primarily on cross-border mobility on the basis of freedom of establish-
ment, and cross-border restructuring and reorganisation.2 Freedom of establishment 
is a particular concern in the Brexit context because the Court of Justice caselaw 
that protects companies that incorporate in one Member State but have their real 
seat in another will not apply to UK companies if the UK becomes a third country 
and that could mean that a UK corporate vehicle is no longer recognised as such 
in Member States’ national conflict of laws or in international law treaties, which 
could then result in shareholders being exposed to personal liability.3 The existing 
literature does not examine in detail areas where EU membership has been seen to 
constrain the development of UK company law, presumably because those areas do 
not present as top priority candidates for immediate post-Brexit significant reform. 
1 Gelter and Reif (2017).
2 Armour et al. (2017); Schillig (2016); Böckli et al. (2017).
3 European Commission, ‘Notice to Stakeholders: Withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU Rules on 
Company Law’, 21 November 2017.
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However, as the UK adjusts over time to its third country status, these areas may 
come to the foreground. Legal capital is one such area.
Section 2 outlines how and why modernisation of legal capital in UK company 
law was held back by obligations arising from EU membership. Section 3 locates 
the need for reform of legal capital within the broader agenda for a system of effec-
tive corporate governance and regulation that supports economically worthwhile 
and sustainable business activity. Section 4 then examines in more detail the case for 
moving away from legal capital and Sect. 5 considers what we have learnt from tak-
ing a significant step in that direction in the reduction of capital context. Section 6 
looks at dividends, which in many ways is the most contentious area because the 
historic concern that legal capital unjustifiably restricted dividend-paying capacity 
has been replaced by a broader concern that dividend payments are excessive and 
benefit shareholders at the expense of long-term corporate sustainability. Section 7 
briefly concludes.
2  EU Law as a Brake on Domestic Company Law in the UK: Legal 
Capital
The baleful influence of the EU on the design of domestic company law in the UK 
is strongly associated with the legal capital doctrine, which takes effect by way of a 
suite of rules relating to the raising and maintenance of share capital. The Second 
Company Law Directive (1976) (now codified as part of Directive (EU) 2017/11324 
but for convenience still referenced here by its historic name) harmonised at a mini-
mum level legal capital requirements for public companies for the protection of 
creditors and shareholders. The Advocate General of the European Court of Jus-
tice has pinpointed ‘the essential purpose’ of the Directive as being ‘to maintain the 
balance of powers between the different organs of the company, especially in case 
of conflicts between those organs’.5 The Directive was lightly amended in 20066 
but against a background of mounting criticism that its approach had not kept pace 
with developments in corporate finance, capital markets and financial reporting, 
the failure to do more to update the Directive was regarded by many as a missed 
opportunity.
A re-examination of the extensive reviews that preceded the Companies Act 
2006, the last comprehensive overhaul of company law in the UK, shows that at 
that time the need to remain consistent with EU rules was seen to be a barrier to 
4 Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 relating to 
certain aspects of company law [2017] OJ L169/46.
5 Case C-526/14 Kotnik and others v. Državni zbor Republike Slovenije, ECLI:EU:C:2016:570, [2017] 
1 CMLR 753. This case and also Case C-41/15 Dowling v. Minister for Finance, ECLI:EU:C:2016:836, 
[2017] 3 CMLR 27, establish that these protections relate to normal times and that they give way in 
the face of exceptional measures taken by national authorities in response to serious disturbance of the 
economy and which are aimed at ensuring EU systemic safety and stability.
6 Directive 2006/68/EC [2006] OJ L264/32.
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desirable reform.7 In a White Paper that preceded the new Act, the government 
explained that ‘In advance of significant amendments to the EU legislation, it would 
not be possible to make major changes to our capital maintenance regime in respect 
of public companies’ and that it would therefore give priority to ‘fundamental 
reform of the capital maintenance regime through reform of the 2nd Company Law 
Directive’.8 This was echoed in Parliament by the government spokesperson: ‘On 
capital maintenance, for example, which is a large chunk of what remains in the 
1985 Act, we are pressing for fundamental reform in the EU. To restate in advance 
of that would not be helpful for users’.9 The UK government’s desire for meaning-
ful reform of the rules on legal capital at the EU level was also seen in its decision 
to opt only selectively into certain minor changes in the area of legal capital made 
by the 2006 amending Directive because it was not convinced that the changes not 
adopted would result in simplification and it was concerned that they would increase 
the burden of legislation in an already complex area.10 The government preferred 
instead to wait for the outcome of a feasibility study on alternatives to the capital 
maintenance regime that the European Commission had commissioned11 (but which 
in the end did not amount to much).
3  Post Brexit Options: The Big Picture
The constraints arising from EU membership will eventually disappear unless the 
deal on the future UK-EU relationship obliges the UK to continue to follow the 
EU rules in this area.12 The UK could, if it wished, choose to align its legal capital 
regime for public companies more closely with the regime for private companies. 
It could also revisit aspects of the private company regime that were not included 
in the simplification exercise effected by the Companies Act 2006. The Companies 
Act 2006 made a number of important changes to the legal capital regime for private 
companies but stopped short of fully making use of its freedom as a Member State 
to simplify private company requirements. Specifically, the option of a liquidity/sol-
vency-based approach to private company distributions was not pursued. This was 
partially justified by reference to the constraining effect of EU membership—the 
argument being that having different regimes for public and private companies could 
give rise to intra-group complications—but other factors were also in play, includ-
ing some lack of conviction as to adequacy of the protection afforded by liquidity/
solvency standards and concern that they could feed short-termism through a failure 
12 As it could—see, e.g., EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, Art. 387 (obliging parties to cooperate on 
the protection of shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders ‘in line with EU rules in this area’.
7 Company Law Review Steering Group (1999a), ch. 3; Company Law Review Steering Group (1999b), 
ch. 3; Company Law Review Steering Group (2000).
8 Department of Trade and Industry (2005), p 43.
9 Hansard (2006), col. 182, Lord Sainsbury.
10 Department of Trade and Industry (2007), ch. 6.
11 KPMG (2006).
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to give due weight to long-term liabilities. Opting to wait for the EU to move first 
effectively side-stepped the need to get to the bottom of those concerns.
Post Brexit (assuming a version that leaves the UK free to redesign its company 
law), it would not be simply a matter of picking up from where things were left in 
2006 and completing unfinished business since much has happened in the interven-
ing years. The big picture back then was one where the UK economy was riding 
high, its capital markets were booming, and its so-called ‘light touch’ approach to 
corporate and financial regulation was seen to be a powerful magnet for interna-
tional businesses. ‘Deregulation’ was a buzzword of the period. Today, the talk is 
more of the social contract between companies and wider society having broken 
down.13 Short-termism on the part of corporate managers and/or institutional inves-
tors is a major public policy concern and there is evidence that the problems are 
getting worse rather than better.14 These problems are strongly associated with deci-
sions that companies make about their capital structures and excess liquidity. There 
is criticism of high payouts through dividends and share buy backs as value-destruc-
tive policies that reduce internal funds available for investment; Andy Haldane, 
chief economist of the Bank of England, has noted that the ‘macro-economic conse-
quences of this behaviour are likely to be far from benign’.15 According to one study, 
between 2000 and 2015 total payouts by way of dividends and share buy backs of 
the UK companies came very close to their total net income during that period.16 
There are concerns that companies may be repurchasing shares to artificially inflate 
executive pay, although research commissioned by the government does not support 
such claims.17 There is particular concern also about correlations between high pay-
out levels and deficits on company employee defined benefit pension schemes.18 At 
the extreme, the financial crisis of 2008 revealed the risk-shifting effects of exces-
sive pursuit of short-term profitability for the benefit of shareholders, with creditors 
and the general public, rather than shareholders, being left to pick up the bill for 
failure.19
If the legal capital doctrine were an effective bulwark against short termist cor-
porate behaviour, it would be hard to make a credible case for reform in the current 
environment. However, it is not. The longstanding criticism of legal capital is that 
its approach is not impactful, either for the internal corporate constituencies whose 
interests it is meant to protect or with respect to broader societal concerns. The doc-
trine takes effect by way of complicated technical rules that can catch out even listed 
companies that might have been expected to have access to the professional advice 
needed to navigate complex rules. As well as being a trap for the unwary, they are 
also not very effective in addressing real issues—the worst of both worlds, in effect. 
13 Plender (2018).
14 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee (2017), paras. 19–20.
15 Haldane (2015).
16 Sakinç (2017).
17 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2018a, 2019b).
18 The Pensions Regulator (2018), p 11.
19 Tooze (2018).
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That plethora of complicated rules did not for example, prevent, the collapse of Brit-
ish Home Stores (BHS) in 2016 where the payment of substantial dividends in good 
years was widely understood to have contributed to its subsequent demise.20 ‘Exces-
sive’ dividends relative to pension scheme deficit contributions was also a salient 
issue in the collapse of Carillion in 2017.21 Rules that miss the point, that can be 
evaded by clever engineering, that force companies into roundabout procedures to 
forgive ‘technical infringements’, or that favour one set of interests at the expense 
of another are potentially worse than useless in that they risk giving a misleading 
impression and/or impose unnecessary costs.
There is continuing debate in the UK on the checks and balances on strategic 
corporate decisions, including those relating to capital, investment and returning 
value to shareholders, that will best support long term success. One of the key pol-
icy choices reflected in the Companies Act 2006 was to retain a shareholder focus 
for directors’ duties rather than a ‘pluralist’ approach that would have required them 
to consider the interests of shareholders alongside those of employees, creditors and 
other stakeholders. The 2006 Act famously sought in section 172 to put an ‘enlight-
ened’ gloss on the shareholder focus by requiring directors to ‘have regard’ to other 
stakeholders and the likely long term consequences of their decisions. Whether sec-
tion 172 has succeeded in effecting substantive change to the way that companies are 
run remains open to question.22 At best it may have some ‘deterrent’ effect.23 More 
ambitious options such as mandatory worker representation on corporate boards to 
ensure that critical decisions reflect a range of views come to prominence periodi-
cally but so far these have struggled to gain serious traction.24 Recent changes have 
moved only rather modestly in a more pluralist direction, for example: new provi-
sions in the non-binding Corporate Governance Code asking the boards of listed 
companies to describe how they have considered the interests of stakeholders when 
performing their duty under section 172 of the 2006 Companies Act and to improve 
engagement with the workforce, with the option of appointing a director from the 
workforce specified as one of the methods by which this could be achieved;25 new 
non-binding Corporate Governance Principles for large private companies that 
expect meaningful engagement and good relationships with material stakeholders 
20 Safari and Gelter (2019).
21 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees 
(2018).
22 There is a vast academic literature but the following selection gives a flavour of the scepticism that 
has dogged section 172: Keay (2012); Williams (2012); Lynch (2012); Grier (2014).
23 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees 
(2018), para. 166 (noting that any deterrent effects provided by section 172 had been insufficient in that 
case).
24 This was seen in 2016/7 when the government floated a range of options for strengthening the con-
sideration of the interests of employees, customers and wider stakeholders in corporate decision mak-
ing including the possibility of worker representation on boards: Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy (2017), sect. 2.
25 The revised Financial Reporting Council (FRC) Corporate Governance Code was published in July 
2018.
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including the workforce;26 and new strategic report disclosure obligations related to 
section 172.27
Should the predictions of a serious breakdown in businesses’ social contract that 
have followed in the wake of BHS and Carillion prove correct, it is possible that this 
could stimulate further serious discussion of pro-worker corporate governance poli-
cies.28 Historically, the debate on the fundamental orientation of directors’ duties 
has proceeded largely without reference to the seemingly arcane technicalities of 
the rules arising from the legal capital doctrine, even though those rules establish 
baseline conditions that frame the space within which strategic corporate decisions 
about investment in corporate development, projects and workforce/returning value 
to shareholders come to be made. However, this is beginning to change: BHS and 
Carillion have put aspects of legal capital on the Conservative government radar.29 
Although there is no sign of an appetite for significant change in the short term, the 
government has undertaken to review the strength of the case for a comprehensive 
review of the UK’s dividend regime and has indicated a willingness to legislate or 
take other steps in the event that market-based solutions do not resolve transpar-
ency-related concerns.30 Recent proposals from the opposition Labour party have 
included tightening the rules on legal capital, including reversing changes made by 
the Companies Act 2006, as part of a package to reform company law in a more 
communitarian direction.31
The view advocated here is that placing faith in rules that have become interna-
tionally discredited and that can get in the way of economically worthwhile activ-
ity would be a wrong turn. Whilst corporate scandals such as BHS and Carillion 
certainly indicate that there are deficiencies in the existing framework within which 
judgments on payouts to shareholders come to be made, correcting those deficien-
cies should be seen, therefore, to be an exercise that extends far beyond the techni-
calities of legal capital. It is right to ask, as the government has done, whether the 
framework within which companies determine dividend payments is fit for purpose 
and the decision to look again at the case for comprehensive reform is welcome.32 
However, getting the whole system right involves thinking about an array of issues 
including: the reliability of corporate accounts;33 the inevitable dependency of 
directors on specialist advice from accountants in such a complex area and how that 
29 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2018b), pp 28–29.
30 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2018b, 2018c), paras. 1.46–1.55.
31 Hudson (2016); Hudson (2018).
32 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2018c).
33 Brexit presents an opportunity to consider whether to continue to adopt International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) for reporting by listed companies. A strong case has been made for the UK 
to retain the IFRS reporting framework: ICAEW Financial Reporting Faculty (2017). But it has been 
argued that Brexit could provide a valuable opportunity to review other aspects of the annual company 
reporting framework and the interface between legal requirements and accounting standards: Walker-
Arnott (2017).
26 FRC, Wates Corporate Governance Principles for Large Private Companies, December 2018.
27 The Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018, amending Companies Act 2006.
28 Moore (2017).
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affects the ability of the directors to discharge their personal non-delegable duties;34 
the robustness of the challenge provided by auditors;35 the effectiveness of oversight 
arrangements relating to financial reporting and auditors,36 and of mechanisms of 
enforcement of directors’ and auditors’ duties more generally;37 and whether there 
is a need to reinforce powers to reverse value-extraction actions taken close to insol-
vency38 and/or to reinforce regulatory intervention powers to ensure pensions are 
protected.39 Care is needed to ensure that the array40 of changes and consultations 
on proposed reforms on many of these issues is properly coordinated. Whilst nar-
rower questions relating to the legal capital doctrine as such are the focus of the rest 
of this article it is important to stress that they should be viewed as an integral part 
of a much larger agenda.
4  Why Move Away from Legal Capital? A Deeper Dive into the Case 
for Reform
In simple terms the legal capital doctrine is about ex ante protection for different 
constituencies within a company.
The legal capital doctrine is primarily associated with creditor protection and 
seeks to protect creditors by saying that only that portion of the net assets that 
exceeds the capital and undistributable reserves can be paid out to shareholders. 
Critics argue that the protection of the extra layer constituted by capital and undis-
tributable reserves is insignificant or potentially even illusory because it is not risk-
weighted, that the legal capital doctrine fundamentally misses the point because 
34 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2018b), pp 30–31 raised the question 
whether directors understand that the commissioning of professional advice (e.g. on the amount of avail-
able distributable profits) does not relieve them of the responsibility to exercise independent judgment. 
But Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2018c), paras. 1.56–1.67 does not high-
light this as a major problem. There are also more technical questions about the extent to which reliance 
on expert advice insulates directors from liability for signing off on defective accounts: Walker-Arnott 
(2017).
35 During 2018, the FRC (itself under attack—see the following note) became increasingly vocal in call-
ing upon the audit profession to improve the standard of its services, e.g.: FRC (2018a, b).
36 A string of corporate scandals (BHS, Carillion) and audit failures led to stinging criticism of the FRC: 
e.g. House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees 
(2018). This, in turn, prompted an independent review led by Sir John Kingman, which concluded that 
that the FRC should be abolished and replaced with an independent statutory regulator called the Audit, 
Reporting and Governance Authority: Kingman (2018). The Kingman recommendations are being taken 
forward: Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2019a).
37 Safari and Gelter (2019).
38 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2018b), pp 13-18 suggested the introduc-
tion of new powers going beyond those in existing insolvency legislation for insolvency office-holders to 
challenge value extraction schemes. However, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
(2018c), section 3 is more focused on improvements to existing recovery powers than on the introduction 
of new powers and there is considerable stress on the need for ‘balance’ so as not to deter investment in 
the market for turnaround finance.
39 Department for Work and Pensions (2018).
40 Immediately previous notes refer.
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what creditors really care about is ability to meet short-term obligations (i.e. liquid-
ity) and longer-term financial commitments (i.e. solvency), and that costly, time-
consuming procedures to comply with detailed legal capital requirements or work 
around them get in the way of economically worthwhile transactions.41 One par-
ticular source of complexity in the UK (where national law actually gold plates EU 
requirements)42 is that distributable reserves are formed by realised profits. Mod-
ern trends in accounting have exacerbated conceptual differences between account-
ing profits and realised profits and have increased volatility around what counts as 
a realised profit. These trends have given extra impetus to the critics who question 
whether the extra comfort that creditors gain from there being a layer of reserves 
that are deemed to be undistributable outweighs the rigidities and complexities asso-
ciated with the legal capital approach.
The legal capital doctrine protects shareholders principally by mandating share-
holder approval by ordinary or special (super-majority) resolution of certain cor-
porate actions relating to capital. Specific shareholder empowerment is an impor-
tant element of modern corporate governance and is intended to address agency 
concerns between management and shareholders. So far as shareholder interests 
are concerned, the debate on the legal capital doctrine is thus less about sweeping 
away fundamentally outdated requirements than about identifying the shareholder 
approval requirements that it would be appropriate to retain in a modernised regime 
relating to corporate actions on capital, recognising that the process of obtaining 
shareholder approval usually results in additional costs and delay.
The legal capital doctrine does not directly protect employees, pension funds or 
other stakeholders as such (though employees etc. may also be creditors) or have 
societal benefit as its direct purpose, and these broader interests are addressed only 
to the extent that they align with creditor and shareholder interests. From stake-
holder and societal perspectives there is a major downside to shareholder empow-
erment strategies because short-termism on the part of equity investors means that 
shareholders cannot be relied upon always to do the right thing for other constituen-
cies within the company or for society at large. There is increasing scepticism that 
initiatives that seek to foster better stewardship by institutional investors to support 
sustainable long-term success do enough to address these wider concerns.43
No one doubts that company law should protect creditors and shareholders but 
much of the world, including leading jurisdictions in the common law world that 
constitutes the UK’s historic legal family, has decided that the prescriptive rules that 
41 For an overview of the competing arguments and references to the academic literature see Ferran and 
Ho (2013).
42 KPMG (2006), p 129, noting the distinction between realised and accounting profit as a ‘particularity’ 
of the UK system.
43 The Stewardship Code was described to be ineffective by the parliamentary committee that investi-
gated Carillion: House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions 
Committees (2018), para. 179. The Kingman Review of the FRC was equally scathing: Kingman (2018). 
In January 2019 the FRC launched a consultation on a new Stewardship Code that, it claimed, would set 
substantially higher expectations for investor stewardship policy and practice with a view to delivering 
sustainable value for beneficiaries, the economy and society. However, the Kingman Review has held out 
a threat of abolition of the Code if it cannot evolve beyond being a driver of boilerplate reporting.
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flow from the legal capital doctrine are not the best way to do so. The Companies 
Act 2006 was a partial step in the ‘modern’, more flexible direction. As we contem-
plate the prospects for further reform in a post Brexit era it is worthwhile to consider 
how changes introduced by that Act have fared and what we have learnt from them: 
have businesses valued the greater flexibility and made use of it; and to the extent 
that practice has changed, have there been any signs that this has come at too great a 
cost in terms of creditor or shareholder (and indirectly, other constituencies’) protec-
tion? The next section explores.
5  What Have We Learnt from Modernisation So Far? 
A Solvency‑Based Approach to Reduction of Capital
So far as creditors’ interests are concerned, the Companies Act 2006 made an impor-
tant move away from the legal capital approach in the area of reduction of capital by 
private companies. Whilst the UK companies legislation already made some use of 
a solvency standards-based approach, the 2006 Act made a significant advance by 
relaxing the requirement for court involvement in reductions of capital and introduc-
ing a new procedure to allow private companies to reduce their capital on the basis 
of shareholder resolutions and a directors’ statement of solvency. Whilst this change 
also had ramifications for shareholders (because the court-based procedure involves 
consideration of their interests before a reduction of capital is approved)44 it had far 
more significance for creditors because they lost rights to be informed about, and to 
object to, proposed reductions, whereas shareholders retained approval rights.
An early report on the practical impact of the solvency statement alternative for 
the reduction of capital for private companies indicated a degree of caution in tak-
ing advantage of the new method.45 Only a quarter of eight companies surveyed had 
used the simplified procedure, although those that had said that it was easier than 
the court-based route. There were suggestions that companies would opt to continue 
to go down the court-based route because it was preferable in terms of public trust 
and delivered a degree of security that outweighed costs savings.46 However, more 
recent indications are that the simplified procedure has grown in popularity and that 
it is regarded as a more cost–effective procedure.47
Has creditor protection been weakened by the introduction of the solvency state-
ment procedure? In this procedure creditors’ interests depend on the judgment of 
the directors who make the solvency statement based on an assessment of the com-
pany’s ability to pay its debts at the date of the statement and as they fall due during 
the year immediately following that date.48 There is no requirement for the state-
ment to be audited. Creditors are thus exposed to the quality of decision-making by 
44 Scottish Insurance Corp v. Williams & Clyde Coal Co Ltd [1949] AC 462, HL.
45 Infogroup/ORC International (2010), pp 117–119.
46 Infogroup/ORC International (2010).
47 Weightmans (2017).
48 Companies Act 2006, s. 643.
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directors and in a technical respect it appears that this does put them at a disadvan-
tage compared to the court procedure. This disadvantage arises from the position 
with respect to liabilities for defects in the operation of the solvency-based proce-
dure. The Companies Act 2006 provides for criminal liability on the part of default-
ing directors if they make a solvency statement without having reasonable grounds 
for the opinions expressed in it and the statement is delivered to the registrar.49 The 
Act is however silent on civil liability consequences. These consequences were in 
issue in BAT Industries Plc v. Sequana where it was held at first instance that lack 
of reasonable grounds for the opinions expressed did not render the solvency state-
ment invalid.50 In coming to this conclusion, the High Court stressed the importance 
of certainty and the dangers of retrospectively unravelling declarations of solvency. 
The argument that this weakened the protection afforded to creditors compared to 
the statutory procedure did not find favour. The Court rejected the argument there 
was no reason why creditors should be in any different position when the company 
used the solvency statement route from the position they would have been in had 
court approval been sought. The Court considered that Parliament had chosen not to 
include a mechanism for creditors to be notified of a proposed reduction or to have 
the right to object and that policy considerations did not require the Court to con-
strue the statutory provisions in any way that was out of the ordinary.
The reasoning in Sequana on this point requires a qualitative and potentially quite 
fine distinction to be drawn between not conducting the holistic and realistic assess-
ment51 needed to come to the required opinions honestly, and not having reasonable 
grounds for the opinions that were formed.52 However, the first instance decision 
on this point was not appealed. There could be circumstances in which in remedial 
terms much could turn on the distinction between not conducting the assessment 
properly and not having reasonable grounds for the opinions formed through that 
assessment.53 In the former situation, the solvency statement would not be properly 
made, and the civil liability consequences would be those arising from an unlawful 
reduction of capital/distribution. The orthodox position is that directors who author-
ise an unlawful distribution face harsh consequences ‘however technical the error 
and however well-meaning the directors who paid it’;54 and recipient shareholder 
can be held liable to repay the amounts received.55 In the latter situation, however, 
49 Companies Act 2006, s. 643(4).
50 Sequana.
51 Trew [2018] EWHC 600 (Ch), para. 182.
52 Trew [2018] EWHC 600 (Ch), para. 182.
53 Trew, paras. 193–197.
54 Toone v. Robbins [2018] EWHC 569 (Ch), para. 48, applying Progress Property Co Ltd v. Moore 
[2011] 1 WLR 1.
55 Remedies that lie against a shareholder who receives an unlawful distribution are a claim in equity 
for unconscionable receipt and the statutory remedy under Companies Act 2006, s. 847 (where, as in 
Sequana, the reduction of capital is used to create a reserve that is later used to pay a dividend). There 
may also be a claim against shareholders for unjust enrichment. The Insolvency Act 2006 provides other 
possibilities for setting aside a disputed distribution: s. 238 transaction at an undervalue; s. 239 (prefer-
ence); s. 423 (transaction defrauding creditors). The Insolvency Act powers can extend to lawful distribu-
tions: Sequana.
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there would be no unlawful reduction of capital and civil liability consequences 
would depend on establishing that directors have breached their duty of care and 
skill and/or their general fiduciary duties with respect to stewardship of the com-
pany’s assets.56
Yet if we step back from the details and return to the broader question whether 
the relaxation of the law has really put creditors in a worse position it is hard to read 
such a conclusion into the potential technical differences in remedial consequences 
revealed by Sequana. After all, the actual decision in Sequana, which was upheld 
on appeal, was in favour of partial recovery of value extracted from the company by 
means of dividends funded by distributable reserves created by the disputed reduc-
tion of capital.57 This was based on an alternative claim that one of the dividends in 
question constituted a transaction at an undervalue for the purposes of section 423 
of the Insolvency Act 1986. This outcome helpfully illustrates the point about the 
importance of looking at the system as a whole and not decoupling a specific rule 
from the broader context in which it operates. Further, to the extent that differences 
in remedial consequences are troubling, the problem could be corrected fairly easily 
by an appropriately targeted legislative intervention. On this point hindsight seems 
to confirm that it was a mistake not to adopt reform recommendations in the lead up 
to the Companies Act 2006 to codify the civil liability consequences where directors 
are at fault (deliberately or otherwise) in making a solvency statement.
It would be troubling if the solvency statement procedure allowed directors to 
apply laxer substantive standards than those that would be applied by a court. How-
ever, there is not such a glaring difference between the standards applicable to the 
solvency statement and court-based procedures as to clearly put creditors in a mate-
rially worse position in that respect. In the solvency statement procedure directors 
must base their opinions on an assessment of assets and liabilities (including contin-
gent and prospective liabilities) that is conducted on a holistic and realistic basis.58 
Case law has established that this does not require directors to assess contingent and 
prospective liabilities on a worst case scenario59 (i.e. ‘if calamity were to strike on 
some or all fronts’).60 It has been held that taking account of such liabilities does not 
mean simply adding them at face value to present liabilities but instead requires the 
directors to make a judgment based on all the circumstances, including consider-
ing practical provisions that the company may be putting in place, such as setting 
aside specific assets, to meet the liabilities.61 Although the solvency test for the pur-
poses of the Companies Act reduction of capital procedure is not the same as the 
tests for insolvency in the 1986 Act there is some common ground. The reduction 
of capital case law has therefore drawn upon the leading case on the statutory test of 
56 Trew, paras. 193–197.
57 [2019] EWCA Civ 112.
58 Companies Act 2006, s. 643; BAT Industries Plc v. Sequana [2016] EWHC 1686 (Ch); LRH Services 
Ltd v. Trew [2018] EWHC 600 (Ch).
59 Sequana.
60 Sequana, para. 327.
61 Sequana.
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insolvency in the Insolvency Act 1986,62 in which the Supreme Court made it clear 
that a ‘balance sheet’ test of insolvency is not rigidly tied to the numbers shown 
on a company’s statutory balance sheet63 and is a matter of judgment that should 
be approached with caution given future unknowns,64 that account should be taken 
of practical arrangements such as insurance to cover liabilities,65 and also that any 
attempt to apply a cash flow/liquidity test beyond the reasonably near future will 
become completely speculative.66
In the court-based procedure for reduction of capital the standards applied by the 
court are seen through the mechanism whereby creditors have standing to object to 
a reduction. Since 200967 standing is conditional on the creditor being able to show 
a ‘real likelihood’ that the reduction would result in the company being unable to 
discharge their debt when it fell due.68 It has been held that the assessment must be 
grounded on the facts as they are known and must not be speculative and must look 
forward only for a period in relation to which it is sensible to make predictions.69 
Working capital models of up to 3 years have been accepted as a sufficient forward 
look.70 The burden of proof is on the creditor to show a causal link between the 
reduction of capital and the company’s inability to discharge their debt.71 As well 
as insurance, the company may resort to other practical arrangements to reassure 
the court. For example, the company may resist any suggestion that there is any real 
likelihood of a reduction resulting in inability to discharge liabilities as they fall due 
by giving an undertaking to retain a portfolio of assets with an appropriate safety 
margin (a ‘locked box’) to be used to meet such creditors’ claims as they fall due.72
Where does this leave us in terms of overall creditor protection? It is a truism to 
say that ‘it is fundamental part of our company law that that capital must be main-
tained and must not be returned to shareholders except in strictly controlled circum-
stances’,73 yet detailed examination of both the court-based and the solvency-based 
procedures for reduction of capital reveals no inclination nowadays to treat this 
protection as so ‘cast iron’ as to require the key assessments to be made by refer-
ence to worst case scenarios that stretch far into the future. This position is consist-
ent with the direction of UK company law with respect to creditors more generally. 
62 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v. Eurosail [2013] UKSC 28.
63 At para. 1 per Lord Walker.
64 At para. 42 per Lord Walker.
65 At para. 38 per Lord Walker.
66 At para. 37 per Lord Walker.
67 Introduced by the Companies (Share Capital and Acquisition by Company of its Own Shares) Regula-
tions 2009 No. 2022. This change, restricting the category of creditor entitled to object, implemented one 
of the amendments to the Second Company Law Directive by Directive 2006/68/EC.
68 Companies Act 2006, s. 646(2).
69 Re Liberty International plc [2010] EWHC 1060 (Ch), [2010] 2 BCLC 665; Re Royal Scottish Assur-
ance plc [2011] CSOH 2, 2011 SLT 264; Re Sportech plc [2012] CSOH 58, 2012 SLT 895; Re Vodafone 
plc [2014] EWHC 1357 (Ch).
70 Re Vodafone.
71 Re Liberty International at para. 11; Re Royal Scottish Assurance at para. 12.
72 E.g., Re Old Mutual plc [2018] EWHC 873 (Ch).
73 Re Northern Engineering Industries plc [1994] B.C.C. 618, CA, at 626 per Millett LJ.
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As a general rule in modern UK company law, subject to the section 172 gloss of 
‘enlightenment’, directors are expected to focus on the success of the company for 
the benefit of members.74 This is subject to any rule of law requiring directors to 
consider or act in the interests of creditors75 but on the basis of lengthy analysis of 
the authorities, the Court of Appeal in Sequana held that the duty becoming credi-
tor-facing only when the directors knew or should have known that the company was 
or was likely (i.e. probable) to become insolvent; it does not arise simply where there 
is a long-term liability on the balance sheet and a risk that the liability might later 
turn out to be larger than the provision that has been made for it.76 At the level of 
the Corporate Governance Code and Listing Rules, as part of their responsibilities in 
the area of audit, risk and internal control the board should state in the annual report 
whether it considers it appropriate to adopt the going concern basis of accounting 
and identify any material uncertainties to the company’s ability to continue to do 
so over a period of at least 12 months from the date of approval of the accounts; it 
should also assess the company’s prospects over a longer period and state whether 
it has a reasonable expectation that the company will be able to continue in opera-
tion and meet its liabilities as they fall due over the period of the assessment.77 The 
second of these provisions relating to longer term viability was introduced into the 
Code in 2014 and practice continues to evolve but there are indications that many 
companies are settling on 3 years as the appropriate period for the forward look.78
Lagging behind now is the position with respect to distributions to sharehold-
ers by way of dividend. This was not included in the legal capital modernisation 
agenda of the Companies Act 2006 in part for fear that allowing companies to pay 
dividends on the basis of a solvency statement would result in insufficient provision 
being made for long term liabilities such as pensions.79 Given what we have learnt 
about the treatment of long-term liabilities in the reduction of capital context—that 
assessments are based on known facts and forward looking only to the extent that 
it is possible to do so without dipping into speculation, and that the treatment of 
future liabilities is a matter of business judgment based on practical considerations, 
amounting, in effect, to a rather commercial test of future viability—that nervous-
ness might not seem misplaced. Whilst for certain purposes reductions of capital 
and dividends (and also share buy backs) can be regarded as functionally equiva-
lent mechanisms for returning value to shareholders, an important difference is 
that there are strong commercial expectations about the stickiness of dividend pay-
ments whereas returns of capital are generally regarded as more exceptional, one-
off events. It might be argued, therefore, that the expected regularity of dividend 
payments magnifies the risk that they will be used as a vehicle for value destruction, 
and therefore that what works for reduction of capital is not necessarily appropriate 
74 Companies Act 2006, s. 172.
75 Companies Act 2006, s. 172(3).
76 Sequana.
77 FRC Corporate Governance Code, paras. 30–31; FCA Listing Rules, 9.8.6(3).
78 FRC Financial Reporting Lab (2017a), p 21.
79 Hansard (2006), cols. 188–189 per Lord Sainsbury (Government spokesperson).
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for the dividend context. On the other hand, it might also be said that experience 
since the enactment of the Companies Act 2006 does not suggest that retention of 
a highly-prescriptive legal capital style approach to the regulation of dividends is 
effective to curb excessive value extraction. Whatever way it is examined, the posi-
tion with respect to dividends looks deeply unsatisfactory. The following section 
goes deeper into the issues and possible options for reform.
6  Distributions from Profits: Dividend Payments
As with other legal capital rules, the EU regime in the Second Company Law Direc-
tive applies only to public companies. Nevertheless the opportunity was not taken to 
simplify the position for private companies in the Companies Act 2006 by allowing 
them to pay dividends on the basis of a directors’ solvency statement. Instead for 
both public and private companies the law remained that dividends could only be 
paid out of accumulated net realised profits as well as an additional balance sheet 
test for public companies only, with the amount available for distribution being 
determined by reference to the reserves shown in the company’s accounts. This was 
in spite of powerful arguments for change that centred both on technical consid-
erations relating to developments in accounting standards that, it was argued, had 
made published accounts more useful for capital market investors but less suitable 
for the determination of distributable reserves and also on more general points about 
the outdated conceptual notions that underpinned the legal capital doctrine and the 
superiority of modern approaches that in focusing on solvency were felt to be better 
aligned with creditors’ real concerns. Some parliamentarians did try to introduce a 
solvency-based regime for dividends by private companies into the Companies Bill 
(later 2006 Act) as it passed through Parliament, arguing that the existing position 
had fallen into ‘disrepute’ and was in need of ‘urgent legal attention’.80 Yet amidst 
concern about the risks associated with a solvency-based approach, in particular that 
it might result in insufficient provision for long-term liabilities such as pensions, the 
more conservative position prevailed.81
With the benefit of hindsight we can see that faith in the intricacies of the legal 
capital doctrine as a bulwark against the extraction of value to the detriment of long-
term liabilities such as pensions was misplaced. The failure of BHS in 2016 has 
come to epitomize the problem.82 BHS, a fixture on the UK high street since 1928, 
was bought by Sir Philip Green in 2000. At the time of the acquisition there was a 
combined surplus of £43 million in the company pension schemes. By 2006 the pen-
sion schemes were in deficit. This reverse coincided with a period when large divi-
dends, funded by loans, were paid out to the Green family. When BHS finally went 
into administration in 2016 the deficit in its employee pension schemes had grown 
80 Hansard (2006), cols. 186–187 per Baroness Goudie (and echoed by others).
81 Hansard (2006), cols. 188–189 per Lord Sainsbury.
82 This paragraph draws on House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, Innovation and Skills 
Committees (2016).
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to more than £200 million. Public disquiet about disparity between dividend growth 
and pension scheme shortfalls was further deepened by the collapse of Carillion in 
2017.83 In this case, the dividend increased in each of the 16 years since the forma-
tion of the company at the same time as the deficit on the pension schemes grew to 
an estimated £800 million.84 The parliamentary inquiry into Carillion noted that the 
policy of increasing the dividend year-on-year had been maintained notwithstand-
ing that the cash-flow was not sufficient to cover the dividend and was fuelled by 
increased borrowing.85 Although many companies treat lack of available cash as a 
constraint on dividends, it is technically possible for a company to be compliant with 
the legal requirements on dividends yet have to borrow actually to pay the dividend 
because distributable reserves are not measured by reference to cash resources. Nev-
ertheless questions have been asked as to whether Carillion’s directors or auditors 
breached any of their legal duties in signing off on these dividends.86
Reference to BHS and Carillion is not to imply a direct causal link between divi-
dends and pension scheme deficits since it is a multiplicity of factors that has made 
defined benefit schemes unaffordable. Nor is it meant to suggest that high-profile 
collapses inevitably indicate a systemic problem with dividends as opposed to (just) 
the possibility of questionable practices in individual cases. The point here is simply 
that the existing framework cannot credibly justify its existence by reference to the 
part it plays in restraining excessive dividends.
It might, of course, be argued that situations such as BHS and Carillion might 
have been even worse but for the layer of prudence imposed by the requirement 
to pay dividends only out of net realised profits and (for plcs) net asset surplus, as 
determined by reference to relevant accounts but the argument carries little weight. 
If we look back to the pre-2006 Act debate, there was real concern then that com-
pliance with changing accounting requirements with respect to pension scheme lia-
bilities would significantly impair dividend-paying capacity under the existing legal 
framework.87 Yet in 2017 alone, companies in the FTSE350 index paid £8.3 billion 
in aggregate pension deficit contributions compared to dividend payouts of £66 bil-
lion.88 To understand fully why fear of dividend blocks has been replaced by the 
reverse concern that the existing system is too generous involves an analysis of the 
complexities of pension scheme accounting that is beyond scope. But at a basic level 
it appears that a key part of the problem is that while pension deficits do have to 
be deducted from reserves available for distribution, the determination of a deficit 
under accounting standards is done on a less prudent basis than the actuarial cal-
culations generally used for the purposes of determining pension deficit recovery 
83 This passage draws on House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and 
Pensions Committees (2018).
84 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees 
(2018), para. 23.
85 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees 
(2018), paras. 16–21.
86 Landell-Mills (2018).
87 Rickford (2004).
88 Cumbo (2018).
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contributions.89 Of course directors should still consider any larger sum they are 
actually required to pay into their pension scheme in exercising their judgment on 
how much to pay out in dividends but the difference in the approaches means that 
they may have a quite a substantial cushion to play with before hitting the hard limit 
of the amount legally available for distribution.90
Added to this, we can also see that champions of reform a decade ago were right 
to predict that the interaction of complex legal and accounting requirements would 
make this area a minefield that companies and their advisers would find it increas-
ingly difficult to navigate. The notion that distributable profits and accounting profits 
are conceptually different (so that if they happen to land in the same place that is 
just coincidental) is not new but the divergence has increased over the years, and 
especially so with the move to IFRS for financial reporting by listed companies and 
the modernisation of the Generally Accepted Accounting Practice in the UK (UK 
GAAP) with respect to fair value accounting because these trends have increased 
the likelihood of accounting profits including amounts that would not be regarded as 
‘realised’ for distribution purposes. As a proxy for the intensification of the resulting 
complexities we can look at the expansion of the guidance published by accounting 
profession that is intended to help companies and their advisers identify, interpret 
and apply the relevant principles to differentiate between profits and distributable 
profits. When the profession first started to issue this supplementary guidance back 
in 1982 it was just a few pages in length91 but the modern equivalent now runs to 
over 170 pages.92 Even prominent FTSE-listed companies have been tripped up by 
the complexities and found themselves in the position of having made illegal divi-
dend payments as a result of ‘technical infringements’.93
Transparency (or the lack of it) around dividend policy has become an increas-
ingly contentious issue. The determination of distributable reserves is linked to 
accounts in that the reference point for profits, losses, assets, liabilities, provisions, 
share capital and reserves is the paying company’s ‘relevant accounts’ (usually 
its last annual accounts).94 However, there is no explicit provision in the Compa-
nies Act 2006 that requires companies specifically to distinguish in their accounts 
between realised and unrealised profits or between distributable and non-distributa-
ble profits. Leading barristers have given conflicting opinions on whether accounts 
give a true and fair view if they do not enable a determination of the profits avail-
able for distribution from the information in the accounts.95 The position main-
tained by (among others) the accounting profession and its current regulator, the 
89 Peters (2016).
90 But in the past few years (partly related to Brexit) the threat of dividend cuts related to pension defi-
cits has re-emerged.
91 Johnson and Patient (1985), Appendix VIII (reproducing ICAEW, TR481 and TR482).
92 ICAEW (2002).
93 The list of companies at fault includes Wm Morrison Supermarkets, Ladbrokes, Al Noor Hospitals, 
Foxtons, STV (Scottish TV), Betfair, and Next.
94 Companies Act 2006, s. 836.
95 Ramage (2017) (providing links to the Opinions of Martin Moore QC (for the FRC) and of George 
Bompas QC.
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Financial Reporting Council (FRC), is that financial statements need not include a 
specific statement on the level of available distributable reserves but this has been 
challenged by the Local Authorities Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF) and some other 
investors as a wrong interpretation of the law.96 A further problem from a transpar-
ency perspective is that within corporate groups it is the accounts of the parent com-
pany that pays the dividend to end shareholders that constitute the reference point 
yet the parent’s individual profit and loss (income) statement may be omitted from 
the published accounts.97 The majority of UK listed companies take advantage of 
this exemption.98
A war of words between investors and the accounting establishment on (for non-
specialists) seemingly abstruse disclosure requirements is a bad sign as to how well 
the existing framework is functioning in practice. Normatively there is more agree-
ment between the various camps on the need to improve disclosure around dividend 
policies and dividend resources both to attract investment and to enable investors 
to act as responsible stewards. It is evident from work led by the FRC’s Financial 
Reporting Lab that investors want more information to help them understand the 
constraints associated with dividend policies. More assurance about the availabil-
ity of distributable reserves (although not necessarily a precise figure) is part of the 
information that investors are seeking but they also want to be better informed about 
other constraints such as the availability of cash, gearing levels, debt covenants and 
regulatory capital requirements.99 Corporate reporting practice is gradually evolv-
ing to meet this demand. The most noticeable change reported thus far has been the 
inclusion in financial statements of reference to distributable profits or distributable 
reserves with 58% of the FTSE 100 making some level of disclosure (up from 40% 
in 2015), and 48% disclosing the specific level of distributable profits/reserves of the 
holding company, the elements of distributable profits/reserves which are not distrib-
utable, or reference to distributable reserves as sufficient or significant.100 There is 
a possibility of this emerging practice being underpinned by legal obligation in due 
course; government has consulted on the sufficiency of transparency and account-
ability to shareholders and others about decisions about dividend payments.101
However, this paper argues for consideration of more radical change that could 
make disclosure relating to the level of distributable reserves a complete non-issue 
by ceasing to rely on distributable reserves as a binding constraint on dividend-
paying capacity and transitioning to an alternative, liquidity/solvency-based regime. 
As discussed earlier, there was considerable support for such a transition in the 
96 In 2016 the LAPFF wrote to FTSE350 companies urging them to disregard the FRC’s position on 
dividend payments.
97 Companies Act 2006, s. 408.
98 FRC Financial Reporting Lab (2015), p 21.
99 FRC Financial Reporting Lab (2015), p 10.
100 FRC Financial Reporting Lab (2017b).
101 In the short term the government will wait to see whether best practice evolves to address con-
cerns about the transparency of capital allocation decisions but says it is prepared to legislate if needed: 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2018c), paras. 1.46–1.55.
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mid-2000s.102 The world is different today and reluctance to tamper with complex 
technical requirements that may not do much good yet at least provide an outer limit 
on what can be distributed can easily be anticipated. Nevertheless, by taking the 
long view it is possible to find several substantial reasons to keep the discussion 
alive and therefore to welcome the government’s willingness to consider afresh the 
case for comprehensive reform.103
The level of undistributable/distributable reserves within a company reflects 
historic decisions on share issuance and capital structure as well as recent trading 
performance and, as such, at any given moment in time it may be too restrictive 
relative to performance, prospects and cash reserves to support otherwise entirely 
reasonable judgements by management that surplus value should be returned to 
shareholders because it cannot be put to productive use, or too generous relative to 
the other demands on the company’s resources. Moreover, whilst the determination 
of available distributable reserves is (just) a legal outer limit on the amount that can 
legally be distributed and does not relieve directors of their responsibility to decide 
on the dividend it would be prudent to pay taking account of other commitments 
such as pension deficit contributions and their general duties, the nuances may not 
always be fully appreciated, resulting in directors finding it difficult to understand 
and discharge their responsibilities correctly. The stress on the need for distribut-
able reserves may distract attention from more economically significant issues about 
liquidity and longer term solvency, or appear to suggest that these are merely sec-
ondary considerations. The availability of distributable reserves may thus provide 
false reassurance.
Technical problems abound: for example, dividend ‘blocks’ within corporate 
groups whereby for complex technical reasons reserves cannot be moved up to the 
level of dividend-paying company (usually the parent company) to support the level 
of dividend that would be consistent with the performance of the group as a whole; 
or the very fact that it is the accounts of the parent company rather than the con-
solidated group accounts that are the reference point for the determination of dis-
tributable reserves. Where confusion results in technical infringements, the recent 
trend has been to forgive the irregularity (often by rather complicated (and costly) 
procedures)104 rather than to pursue the responsible directors or to seek to recover 
the wrongly paid dividends; in this respect, the protection offered by the legal frame-
work does not appear to be much valued in practice.
The core technical problem is the divergence between accounting profits and dis-
tributable profits, and, as discussed earlier, much of the complexity, including the 
102 KPMG (2006), p 128 noting a ‘strong climate of opinion’ in the UK in favour of a fundamental reap-
praisal.
103 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2018c), para. 1.47.
104 Involving Deeds of Release approved by the company in general meeting that release the company’s 
claims against the shareholders who received the dividend and the directors who authorised it. In the 
case of a listed company, approval of the Directors’ Deed of Release as a related party transaction will 
also be required. For an example of a Circular to Shareholders and Notice of General Meeting: https ://
www.nextp lc.co.uk/~/media /Files /N/Next-PLC-V2/docum ents/compa ny-meeti ngs/gener al-meeti ng-circu 
lar-Jan20 16.pdf.
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need for voluminous guidance from the accounting profession, flows from that. This 
divergence was accentuated by the transition to IFRS but in recent years IFRS have 
come under attack for being insufficiently prudent, especially with regard to the rec-
ognition of profits.105 A major driver of this has been dissatisfaction with the role 
of IFRS in the financial crisis. This discontent led to an overhaul of some standards 
(in particular the adoption of IFRS 9 Financial Instruments, described as combining 
‘fair value accounting with the more cautious approach of predecessor standards’)106 
and was part of the background to a revamp of the overall Conceptual Framework 
for IFRS reporting. The most recent version of the Conceptual Framework includes 
reference to ‘prudence’ although it does not go as far as some critics had called 
for because it does not incorporate an asymmetric form of prudence which would 
involve applying a lower threshold for the recognition of liabilities and losses than 
for assets and gains.107 The Conceptual Framework also gives limited ground to 
critics in another important and relevant respect by clarifying that the objective of 
financial statements—to provide financial information that is useful to users in mak-
ing decisions relating to providing resources to the entity—includes information that 
is helpful to users in assessing management’s stewardship of the entity’s economic 
resources.108 However, calls for more radical reform continue to be made.109
The paper cannot go deeper into the debate around IFRS and does not need to. 
The relevant point is that ‘fixing’ the accounting standards is part of the picture, 
but so too is ‘fixing’ the legal requirements and the proposition here is that an exer-
cise in fixing the legal side should include re-examining whether to move away 
from the legal capital doctrine to an approach that has liquidity/solvency at its cen-
tre. (Though as an incidental point with regard to IFRS, it is just worth noting that 
whilst Brexit would present the possibility in theory of breaking away entirely from 
IFRS, that does not seem to be a realistic option).
7  Outlining the Reform Agenda and Concluding
There is a clear need for intervention to curb the societal harm that can flow from 
excessive dividends and other forms of value extraction from companies. However, 
whilst company law and corporate governance have acquired a regulatory dimension 
that goes beyond the older conception of their core purpose as being to address inter-
nal agency problems between owners and managers, the heavy lifting with regard to 
societal concerns is best done by public interest focused regulatory regimes. There 
are already in existence various regulatory intervention powers to restrict the pay-
ment of dividends in certain circumstances, including, for example, the powers of 
105 Prudence being defined as ‘the exercise of caution when making judgements under conditions of 
uncertainty’: International Accounting Standards Board (2018), para. 2.16.
106 FT Editorial (2018).
107 International Accounting Standards Board (2018), para. 2.17.
108 International Accounting Standards Board (2018), paras. 1.2–1.4.
109 E.g., FT Editorial (2018).
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bank supervisors to restrict or prohibit dividends and the restrictions that are trig-
gered when a bank fails to meet capital adequacy requirements are examples of this 
type of intervention.110 Another example, which is of direct relevance to the issues 
discussed in this paper, is the intervention power of the Pensions Regulator under 
section 231 of the Pensions Act 2004. This power was recently used against South-
ern Water Services Ltd in circumstances where the Regulator considered that the 
company’s defined benefit pension scheme was carrying unnecessary risk due to a 
recovery plan that extended over a long period during which time the company was 
planning to pay dividends to shareholders. The outcome of the intervention was that 
the company agreed to pay significantly higher deficit recovery contributions under 
a shorter recovery plan and also to accelerate the recovery contributions if dividends 
outside of the group to shareholders exceeded an agreed threshold. Other such tar-
geted powers could be introduced and/or the use of existing ones could be stepped 
up. Bearing in mind the importance of dividend income for pension funds and oth-
ers, the adoption and the use of such public interest powers must, of course, be care-
fully calibrated so as not to undermine investors’ reasonable expectations regarding 
investment returns.
With company law relieved of the obligation singe-handedly to address societal 
concerns, attention could then turn to reviewing the dividend framework as part of 
a much broader agenda to keep company law up to date and focused on long term 
sustainable corporate success. It is apparent from the experience of other countries 
that a liquidity/solvency-based approach could take a variety of forms. The existing 
solvency statement procedure for reduction of capital is an obvious starting point but 
there are other models for what a modern approach could look like. Much work was 
done on identifying different models already in operation around the world prior to 
the Companies Act 2006 and that learning is still available.111 Comparative refer-
ence could also be made to states and countries that have gone through their own 
reform exercise in the intervening years. One example is Australia where the law 
was changed in 2010 to permit dividends to be paid from profits or other reserves 
provided the company remained solvent.112 The conditions for a lawful dividend are 
that the company’s assets exceed its liabilities before the dividend is declared and 
the excess is sufficient for the payment of the dividend (a ‘balance sheet’ test); the 
dividend is fair and reasonable to the shareholders as a whole; and the payment of 
the dividend does not materially prejudice the company’s ability to pay its creditors. 
There has been some teething trouble with this reform but lessons from that type of 
experience can be just as valuable as those drawn from alternative frameworks that 
110 These powers and restrictions are derived from Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and investment firms [2013] OJ L176/338. It is assumed that the UK 
will continue to apply this prudential framework, which is based on and gives effect to the Basel stand-
ards agreed at international level.
111 Two detailed sources are Rickford (2004); KPMG (2006).
112 Australian Corporations Act 2001, s. 254T(1).
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are working well.113 Singapore also considered reform during this period but was 
not persuaded to adopt a liquidity/solvency-based approach for dividends because 
current rules were ‘well known and had the advantage of being simple and straight-
forward’.114 Important differences between Singapore and UK law is that under Sin-
gaporean law dividends are payable out of ‘profits’ without the additional gloss that 
profits must be ‘realised’ and prior accumulated losses need not be cleared before 
payment of dividends is allowed. Aligning Singaporean law more closely to UK law 
did not appeal ‘because it would complicate the issue’.115 Potentially fruitful refer-
ence could also be made to developments in US corporations law, where pockets of 
older thinking persisted notwithstanding an overall trend in State laws away from 
legal capital, for example the background to and experience of simplifying amend-
ments to the California Corporations Code in 2011 that gave boards of directors of 
corporations more latitude when determining amounts available for distribution, 
including permitting them to consider fair values rather than historical carrying 
costs and to base their determination on valuations derived from any method that 
was reasonable in the circumstances.
Should the option of radical reform fail to gain traction in the UK, a ‘half way 
house’ would be to abolish the ‘realisation’ requirement and link dividend-paying 
capacity simply to accounting profits, to this extent mirroring the Singapore posi-
tion. That would at least remove the need for extensive guidance on the realisa-
tion concept. Dispensing with one of the layers of complexity would go some way 
towards making it harder for directors to hide between technicalities in discharg-
ing their responsibilities and could also facilitate stronger accountability. This could 
even be packaged as a Brexit related reform although technically realisation is a 
domestic requirement not imposed by EU law.
Mention of Brexit takes the discussion in this paper full circle. Taking Centros 
as its point of departure, this paper has argued for the revival of interest in an old 
idea—reform of the legal capital (maintenance of capital) doctrine. Brexit is rel-
evant to the extent that it could provide the UK with the opportunity to make more 
radical changes than are open to it as a Member State. But to reform legal capital 
just because Brexit may make it possible to do so would have little merit. This paper 
has drawn upon experience since Centros and, more particularly, since the enact-
ment of the UK Companies Act 2006 to put forward some rather more substantial 
arguments in favour of revisiting legal capital. Three points stand out. First, recent 
corporate collapses have shown that any lingering belief in the legal capital doctrine 
as an effective bulwark against short termist corporate behaviour should finally be 
retired. Second, events have tended to confirm the pessimistic predictions that were 
around at the time of the Companies Act 2006 with regard to increasing complexity 
113 There is uncertainty whether the distinction between capital and profit continues. Case law strongly 
suggests that dividends can be paid from capital as well as profits: Grant-Taylor v. Babcock & Brown Ltd 
(In Liquidation) [2016] FCAFC 60 at paras. 37-39 but technically these remarks were not strictly neces-
sary to the Court’s decision.
114 Ministry of Finance Steering Committee for Review of the Companies Act (2011), para. 117.
115 Ministry of Finance Steering Committee for Review of the Companies Act (2011), para. 119.
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associated with applying the legal rules on distributions in the context of modern 
financial reporting requirements. Third, the practical operation of reforms intro-
duced by the Companies Act 2006 have led to a more mature understanding, includ-
ing binding legal authority, on how a solvency statement-based approach works to 
protect creditors’ interests. There is also an increasingly substantial body of com-
parative learning on how to move away from legal capital to draw upon, including 
from countries and states that have recently reformed their laws.
This paper has located the need for reform of legal capital within the broader 
agenda for a system of effective corporate governance and regulation that supports 
economically worthwhile and sustainable business activity. Modernising the base-
line conditions governing capital structure and value retention/extraction is best 
thought of as a complementary step to be taken alongside deep reflection on how 
best to incentivise corporate management to use their discretionary powers in ways 
that are sustainable, compatible with the interests of all corporate stakeholders and 
not harmful to society as a whole.
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